Evolution and Rationality: simple thoughts for future investigation

Much attention has been paid of late to the place of the conscious mind within evolutionary history. Few serious scientists or philosophers question the emergence of consciousness as a property of the human brain from less complex properties of animal minds. A biological theory of the mind-brain has definite implications as to the limits of human cognition, and exploration of these limits are often more enlightening than revelation of the mechanisms themselves.

One of the properties of the human mind which stands out in this evolutionary development is that of rationality itself. Simplistic explorations of evolved rationality view it from the perspective of natural selection. Without doubt, there is a selective role to be played in the weighing of reasons, rational prediction, and the resulting evolutionary effects of improvements in reasoned action. Such a capability would certainly confer an advantage, as those possessing this ability would be able to simulate options for action and choose safer options. By not exposing themselves to the risks inherent in more dangerous actions versus alternatives, they would thereby improve survivability for themselves and their genetic heirs. 

Such is the general theory for selection and development of consciousness and rationality; however, to my mind, the more interesting question lies in the metaphysical questions of human rationality. As Kant was well aware, our perceptions of the world are incapable of representing the world as it is. Even the idea of a world as it is, seems quite fraught, since it begs the question of how it truly exists for whom or from whose perspective. (Insert standard comments on general relativity here). 

In a similar vein, our rational representation of the world and our ‘logical’ exploration thereof must be limited by the physical instantiation of the human mind and further by its evolutionary history. Evolution is a tinkerer, it has been said; and while our minds have evolved to function incredibly successfully within a hostile environment, predicting and avoiding danger, and rationally developing technological innovations that further remove us from the dangers of our surroundings, the successive accumulations of these adaptive modules in no way guarantees access to real logical truths, any more than Kant's theory of practical reason held minds as able to grasp the world im selbst.  

Logical systems instantiated in the brain must have their limits. If we represent our rational operations in this limited physical system, are we not perpetually cut off from access to the truths of the world? If human reason is capturable as principles, and its representation is implemented in whatever neural code the brain uses to logically transform the information it receives, isn’t our Logic then just as evolved as our opposable thumbs or our appendix? Godel's Proof of Incompleteness must have implications for our ability to capture and represent the true nature of the universe in our own symbolic representational systems (if human intelligence is indeed symbolic in that representation mathematical sense.) 

The simple fact that recursion of language allows for the expression of statements like the liar's paradox, 'This sentence is false,' would at least raise the possibility of such expressions in mentalese. And if unprovable representations can occur at the basic levels of mental representation, then logic as we would conceive it, more importantly as we have evolved it, is surely threatened. 

What does this mean for the scientific endeavor or even for our daily reasoning? While our knowledge and rationality are well evolved for survival in a competitive world, they are certainly not proven for the exploration of logical scientific theorizing of a priori truths. I would imagine that the whole of the scientific endeavor carried out by humans, is possibly (if logical possibility has any significant meaning) devoid of any accuracy. And since we are limited in our meta-analyses of science by our physically evolved brains and the method of representation they employ, we are doomed to be incapable of stepping out of our cognitive shell in our invented logics. 

I find this idea fascinating, and I’m sure that, philosophically naïve as I am, I am unaware of the multitudes of publications that have devoted themselves to this question. It is certainly something I intend to devote a great deal of study to. But in the meantime, I will just entertain myself with my own naïve musings. I hope in the weeks to come to be able to explore these ideas in published literature and familiarize myself with some of the problems that have been discussed. 

I find myself drawn to ideas of the recursiveness of mind and of mental representations, and the supra-mental nature of the social environment of science and knowledge as somehow creating loopholes in the argument I have made above. I do not hold out any hope of dismissing the idea of limited reason, but merely of grounding them in closer study, and exploring ways in which the nature of human rationality is related to other aspects of epistemology, mind, and the social network that constitutes human scientific knowledge.